IRAN-IRGC’s Rising Drone Threat () von NCRI U.S. Representative Office

Foreword by General James T. Conway

Preface by Ambassador Robert G. Josep

Summary

Introduction

1.Production of UAVs

1.1. History of Iran regime's UAV production

1.2. Aviation Industries Organization

1.3. Quds Air Industries

1.4. Fajr Aerospace and Composite Materials Industries

1.5. Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company (HESA)

1.6. Basir Industries

1.7. Bespar Sazeh Composite Company

1.8. Ghazanfar Roknabadi Industries

1.9. Paravar Pars Company and Sepehr Airport

1.10. Armed Forces UAV Production Center in Semnan

1.11. Civilian companies used as covers for UAV part production

1.12. Procurement of UAV parts smuggled from abroa

1.13. Specs on some of the drones produced by the IRGC

2.Utilization of UAVs

2.1. History of the IRGC's use of UAVs

2.2. UAV Command of the IRGC Aerospace Force

2.2.1. Location of IRGC Aerospace UAV Command (Dastvareh Barracks)

2.2.2. Kashan UAV unit-Karimi Base

2.2.3. Isfahan UAV unit-Badr Base

2.2.4. Ahvaz UAV unit

2.2.5.Kermanshah UAV unit

2.2.6. Sajjad Barracks

2.2.7. Falaq Barracks

2.3. UAV Command of IRGC Ground Force

2.4.Use of UAVs by other IRGC and Army forces

3. Using UAVs to incite war and terrorism

3.1. Quds Force Intelligence

3.2. Quds Force Training

3.3. Quds Force Logistics and Support

3.4. UAV attack on Saudi oil refinery

3.5. Sending drones to Syria

3.6. Sending drones to Iraq

3.7. Sending drones to Lebanon

3.8. Sending drones to Yemen

3.9.Sending drones to Palestine

3.10. Attacks in Kurdish regions

4. Conclusion

5. List of publications

6. About NCRI-US